Court backs Yemisi Wada’s criticism of charity fund mismanagement, dismisses Mo Abudu’s libel appeal

The Court of Appeal, Lagos division on July 2, threw out an appeal filed by movie producer, Mosunmola Abudu aka Mo Abudu against businesswoman and child advocate, Yemisi Wada for lack of merit.

In its judgement delivered by Justice Muslim Sule Hassan, the court resolved issues 1, 2 and 3 against Mo and consequently dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The court further affirmed the judgement of the high court of Lagos State delivered in 2019.

Back in 2019, Mo Abudu filed a libel suit against Yemisi, demanding N200 million in damages over a libelous publication about funds misappropriation generated from a concert put together by Mo in 2009 to raise money for homeless children. Mo claimed the libel was committed in an article in Thisday Newspaper titled ‘Muted Voices’ and published on September 20, 2009.

Mo among other things sought:

1. N100,000,000 (One hundred million naira) in general damages
2. N100,000,000 (One hundred million naira) in aggravated damages for deliberate and malicious defamation
3. An order compelling the defendant (Yemisi) to retract the ‘offensive’ article with a letter of apology to the plaintiff (Mo) to be published in Thisday Newspaper and two other national dailies.
4. An injunction restraining the defendant or her agents from further publishing or causing it to be published, the said words or any words similarly defamatory of the claimant.

The defendant (Yemisi) denied the claims on grounds of justification and fair comment. In her defence, she said she made the publication in her rights as a child advocate and in national and public interest, adding that the said funds were not channeled for the purpose of rehabilitating street children.

The trial court however dismissed Mo’s libel claim for want of proof in the article published. Aggrieved with the judgement, Mo filed an appeal.

Before considering the substantive appeal, the respondent asked the Court of Appeal to strike out two of the appellant’s grounds of appeal, arguing that they were based on comments made by the trial judge rather than the actual reasons for the judgment. The court rejected this objection, holding that the grounds of appeal clearly arose from the trial court’s decision and were therefore competent. The motion was dismissed.

The appellant argued that because the respondent admitted writing and publishing the article, the element of publication had already been proved and there was no need to call additional witnesses.

But the court disagreed.

While acknowledging that publication in a national newspaper amounts to publication to the public, the court held that publication alone does not establish libel. A claimant must also prove that the publication lowered her reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of society. The appellant had testified that friends and associates contacted her after reading the article, but she failed to call any of those people as witnesses. According to the court, at least one independent witness should have testified that the publication damaged the appellant’s reputation. The court emphasized that a person’s reputation depends on how others perceive them, not how they perceive themselves. Therefore, evidence from third parties was necessary to establish that the publication actually caused reputational harm.

The appellant further argued that the words used in the article were clear and unambiguous and that the trial judge should simply have interpreted them using their ordinary English meaning instead of insisting on evidence from third parties.

Again, the court rejected the argument. It held that even where the language appears straightforward, the court should not assume that reasonable people understood the publication in a defamatory sense without evidence. Doing so would amount to speculation and would improperly place the judge in the role of a witness. The court therefore upheld the trial judge’s finding that the appellant failed to establish the defamatory effect of the publication because she produced no independent evidence from readers whose opinion of her had been lowered.

The court then considered whether the respondent successfully relied on the defences of justification and fair comment.

The appellant argued that the respondent failed to prove the truth of several statements made in the publication, including claims about the proportion of funds spent on organizing the concert and allegations concerning financial accountability. The respondent maintained that the publication concerned money raised from the public for charity and that members of the public were entitled to question how those funds were managed. She also argued that, as both a donor and a child-rights advocate, she had every right to express concerns over the use of the money.

The court agreed, noting that the funds in question were public donations raised for a charitable purpose and not the appellant’s private money. Because the appellant had solicited contributions from the public, she should reasonably expect scrutiny over how those funds were spent. According to the court, the respondent’s article was essentially calling for greater transparency and accountability rather than maliciously attacking the appellant’s reputation.

The court observed that instead of treating the publication as an attack, the appellant could have simply provided a fuller explanation of how the funds were utilized. It stated that this would have enhanced public confidence in the charitable cause. The court also held that the respondent’s criticism constituted fair comment on a matter of public interest, particularly because she herself had contributed to the fundraising exercise.

The appellant alleged that the respondent acted out of malice and even reported the matter to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) because of personal hostility.

But the Court found no evidence of malice. It ruled that reporting concerns to the EFCC does not, by itself, demonstrate bad faith. Rather, once a complaint is made, it becomes the responsibility of the EFCC to investigate. The court found nothing to suggest that the respondent’s actions were motivated by spite or personal vendetta.

Having resolved all three issues against the appellant, the Court of Appeal held that the appeal lacked merit. It affirmed the judgment of the Lagos State High Court, which had dismissed the libel claim, and made no order as to costs.

Key legal principles from the judgment

The court reaffirmed that:

1.Publication of a statement alone does not establish libel.

2.A claimant must prove that the publication lowered their reputation in the estimation of reasonable members of society.

3.Independent evidence from at least one third party may be necessary to establish reputational harm.

4.Public figures who raise money from the public for charitable purposes should expect public scrutiny over the use of those funds.

5. Honest criticism on matters of public interest can qualify as fair comment.

6.Reporting concerns to law enforcement agencies, without more, does not amount to proof of malice.